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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner, :
v.

:

LEON EARL DENNEY,

:

Case No.

Category No. 2

Defendant-Respondent. :

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Utah Court of Appeals rendered a decision
so far departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of
supervision, when the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion nunc pro tunc terminating probation
after a statutory eighteen month period:
1.

holding that the "unequivocal" sentencing order did

not state that defendant's three year sentence of probation was
actually two consecutive eighteen month terms notwithstanding the
trial court's intent, when in fact the order was ambiguous as
directly contrary to law and intent should have been considered,
and,
2.

prior to reversal, the Court of Appeals did not, as

required, address whether defendant either waived his statutory
right to termination of probation after eighteen months, or

otherwise should have been estopped from attacking the trial
court's decision.
OPINION BELOW
State v. Penney, slip op. No. 880371-CA (June 14, 1989,
Utah Ct. of App.).

(See Addendum A.)

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This petition is from an opinion of the Utah Court of
Appeals filed June 14, 1989, reversing the trial court's denial
of defendant's motion nunc pro tunc terminating probation after a
statutory eighteen month period.

This Court has jurisdiction to

consider this petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a)
(1987) (Supp. 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
For purposes of this brief, appellant relies on:
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1982) (Supp. 1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On September 18, 1985, defendant, Leon Earl Denney,
pled guilty to two third degree felony offenses of Uttering a
Forged Prescription, in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert F. Owens, Associated
District Judge, sitting by appointment, presiding (R. at 14-16).
Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable J. Philip Eves,
Associated District Judge, sitting by appointment, on March 20,
1986 to two concurrent terms of zero to five years at the Utah
State Penitentiary (R. at 40-46).

At defendant's request, by and

through his attorney, the execution of his prison term was
suspended or stayed and he was placed on probation for a period

of three years (two consecutive eighteen month terms) (R. at 26,
40-46).
On April 12, 1988, during defendant's continuing
probation, Judge Eves issued an Order to Show Cause, ordering
defendant to appear and show cause why his probation should not
be revoked on the allegations that defendant had violated his
probation agreement (R. at 62-65).
On April 28, 1988, defendant moved the court nunc pro
tunc to terminate his probation following eighteen months of
alleged incident-free probation (R. at 67).
On May 17, 1988, following a hearing on defendant's
motion to terminate probation nunc pro tunc, the motion was
denied (R. at 75). Also on May 17, 1988, the Order to Show Cause
Hearing was held.

Following the hearing, defendant's probation

was revoked and the original concurrent sentences of zero to five
years were imposed, upon a finding by the court that defendant
had violated the specific terms of his probation agreement (R.
77-79).
On June 14, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion nunc pro tunc.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 20, 1986, after pleading guilty to two counts
of Uttering a Forged Prescription, defendant was sentenced to
serve two concurrent terms of zero to five yeats dl the Utah
State Penitentiary by the Honorable J. Philip Eves, sitting as
District Judge by assignment (Transcript of the Sentencing
Hearing held March 19, 1986 [hereinafter T.3/19/86] at 41).

After a lengthy hearing at which defendant and his
counsel argued strenuously against commitment to prison, Judge
Eves suspended or stayed the execution of the prison term.

At

the express request of defendant through his counsel (See Defense
Counsel's Recommendation, R. at 26, and attached as Addendum B),
defendant was placed on an extended term of three years probation
under the intensive supervision of Adult Probation and Parole
(T.3/19/86 at 41). The three year term of probation was a
combination of two eighteen-month probationary terms upon
conviction of two third degree felony offenses, running
consecutively (Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Terminate
Probation held May 17, 1988 [hereinafter T.5/17/88] at 6). The
granting of probation was contingent upon defendant's compliance
with the terms of his probation agreement, which defendant
indicated that he understood (T.3/19/86 at 41-43).
On April 12, 1988, during defendant's continuing
probation, Judge Eves issued an Order to Show Cause, ordering
defendant to appear and show cause why his probation should not
be revoked on the allegations that defendant had been arrested
for Driving Under the Influence in the State of Nevada, and that
defendant had committed credit card fraud (See copy of the
allegations of the Order to Show Cause, R. at 62-65, and attached
as Addendum C).
On April 28, 1988, defendant moved the court nunc pro
tunc to terminate his probation following eighteen months of
alleged incident-free probation (R. at 67). On May 17, 1988,
following a hearing on defendant's motion to terminate probation

nunc pro tunc, the motion was denied (R. «i I 75). At the hearing,
Judge Eves indicated that defendant's original probationary
sentence was two consecutive eighteen month terms totaling three
years (R. at 6-7).
Also on May 17, 1988, the Order to Show Cause Hearing
was held (See Transcript of the Order to Show Cause Hearing held
May 17, 1988 [hereinafter T. OSC 5/17/88]).

Following the

hearing, defendant's probation was revoked and the original
concurrent sentences of zero to five years were imposed, upon a
finding by the court that defendant had consumed alcohol and had
been convicted of driving under the influence (T. OSC 5/17/88 at
7), and had knowingly furnished false information to obtain a
credit card; each of which was in violation of the specific terms
of defendant's probation agreement (T. OSC 5/17/88 at 37).
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion nunc pro tunc terminating
his probation after eighteen months.

State v. Penney, slip op.

No. 880371-CA, at 5 (June 14, 1989, Utah Ct. of App.).

The Court

found that the sentencing order:
as written and pronounced, sentenced the
defendant to three years probation. The
judge did not state in his order that the
term of three years was actually two
consecutive terms of eighteen months each.
Although, [sic] the judge may have intended
the terms to run consecutively, we do not
examine his intent where the written order is
unequivocal.
Id. nf 4.

The Court also indicated that "because the term of

probation automatically terminated after eighteen months

(

not reach the merits of the State's argument of waiver and
estoppel.

Id.

ii did

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should grant certiorari to review the Court
of Appeals decision because that court erred in its decision that
the probation order originally imposed in this case was
unambiguous.

The Court of Appeals erred in determining that the

automatic probation termination provisions were applicable in
this matter.
The Court of Appeals also erred in not addressing the
issues of waiver and estoppel raised by the State which precluded
an automatic termination of probation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SENTENCING ORDER BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS
AMBIGUOUS, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY
NOT CONSIDERING THE ENTIRE RECORD TO DETERMINE
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTENT IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial
of defendant's motion nunc pro tunc terminating probation,
concluding that the "judge did not state in his order that the
term of three years was actually two consecutive terms of
eighteen months each", and since the order was "unequivocal" the
order "cannot be varied by remarks made in a later hearing to
coincide with what the judge may have intended."

State v.

Penney, slip op. No. 880371-CA, at 4 (June 14, 1989, Utah Ct. of
App.).
Such a characterization of the sentencing order was
erroneous, for the order contained an obvious latent ambiguity,
and the Court of Appeals should have properly relied upon other
parts of the record to determine the intent of the trial court.

At the time defendant was originally sentenced, Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (1982) (Supp. 1986) provided, "[u]pon
completion without violation of 18 months probation in felony or
class A misdemeanor cases, . . . the offender shall be terminated
from sentence, unless the person is earlier terminated by the
court."

In the present case the trial court order provided "IT

IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, Leon Earl Denney, be placed
on probation for a period of three (3) years from and after March
20, 1986" (R. at 41). The plain language of the sentencing
order, without evidence of the trial court's intention (i.e.
consecutive probationary terms), cannot be read consistently with
the statute, and would be ambiguous to those who are required to
enforce the judgment.

The sentencing order on its face appears

not to be ambiguous, but a latent ambiguity clearly arose

This provision was amended effective April 24, 1989 and now
provides:
Probation may be terminated at any time at
the discretion of the court or upon
completion without violation of 36 months
probation in felony or Class A misdemeanor
cases, or 12 months in cases of Class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions. If the
defendant, upon expiration or termination oi
the probationary period, had outstanding
fines or restitution owing, the court may
retain jurisdiction of the case and continue
the defendant on bench probation or place the
defendant on bench probation for a limited
purpose of enforcing the payment of fines and
restitution. Upon motion of the prosecutor
or victim, or upon its own motion, the court
may require the defendant to show cause why
his failure to pay should not be treated as
contempt of court or why the suspended jail
or prison term should not be imposed.
Utah Code Ann. $ 77-18-l(7)(a) (1982) (Supp. 1989).

eighteen months after the probation went into effect.

During

enforcement of the second probationary term, without evidence of
the trial court's intention, the order was contrary to S 77-18l(10)(a).2
As noted by the Court of Appeals, the court in State v.
Garcia, 659 P.2d 918 (N.M. App. 1983) held:
Where the language of a judgment is clear and
unambiguous, it must be given effect as it is
written, Parks v. Parks, 91 N.M. 369, 574
P.2d 588 (1978); however, when the meaning is
ambiguous, the other documents of record may
be resorted to for purposes of construing the
meaning of the judgment.
Id. at 923 (emphasis added).

See also Rinehart v. State, 234

N.W.2d 649, 656 (Iowa 1975)("A decree is to be construed like
other written instruments; the determining factor is the

This Court's decision in State v. Green, 757 P.2d 465 (Utah
1988), is distinguishable from the present case, and is not
controlling. In Green, this Court held that a defendant's
probation could not be revoked in a revocation proceeding
initiated after the statutory probation term under $77-181(10) (a) had expired. In the present case, unlike Green,
revocation proceedings were initiated during the continuing
probation of defendant in his second term of the consecutive
probationary sentence. As required by former S 77-18-1(10)(a),
defendant's first term of probation "terminated" after eighteen
months. Simultaneously, defendant's second term of probation
began, during which time defendant's probation was properly
revoked. The issue here is not whether Green is controlling, but
whether consecutive probationary periods are valid under state
law. The Court of Appeals did not reach this issue. See State
v. Denney, slip op. No. 880371-CA, at 4 (June 14, 1989, Utah Ct.
of App.). Unlike Green, wherein the State argued that a
probation violation -tolled" the probationary period, the State
is now arguing that the violation occurred during a second,
consecutive probationary term.
Green is also distinguishable because it involved a single
probationary term for a single criminal conviction. In the
present case, defendant was convicted of two criminal charges and
given two consecutive probationary terms.

intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the
judgment").
The Court of Appeals conceded, "after reviewing the
record, it appears that the trial court may have intended to
sentence defendant to two consecutive terms of probation lasting
eighteen months each."

See State v. Penney, slip op. No. 880371-

CA, at 3 (June 14, 1989, Utah Ct. of App.).

As the Court

recognized, such intention can be established from the record,
which includes the statement of Judge Eves (who originally
sentenced defendant) at the hearing to terminate defendant's
probation, that "[a]t the time the probation was imposed, the
defendant had been convicted of two third degree felonies.

The

18 months' probation was imposed on each felony to run
consecutively"
(T.5/17/88 at 6).
The sentencing order was less than "unequivocal",
containing an obvious latent ambiguity.

The Court of Appeals

should have established the intention of the trial court by
reliance on the entire record, and reached the merits of the
efficacy of consecutive probationary periods.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY HOLDING THAT
DEFENDANT'S PROBATION AUTOMATICALLY TERMINATED
AFTER EIGHTEEN MONTHS, WITHOUT FIRST
ADDRESSING WHETHER DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT
TO THE STATUTORY TERMINATION, AND/OR WHETHER
HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION.
The Court of Appeals, in holding that defendant's
probation automatically terminated after eighteen months, failed
to respond to the State's arguments of waiver and estoppel.

The Court of Appeals should have responded to these
issues prior to making its decision, and it was erroneous for the
Court not to do so.

The Court of Appeals could not have properly

made a determination that defendant had a right to automatic
probation termination after eighteen months, without first
determining whether he had previously waived that right or should
have been estopped from asserting that right.

The State

specifically argued that defendant explicitly or implicitly
waived his right of probation termination after eighteen months
and/or was estopped from asserting the right, when he
specifically requested, through his counsel's sentencing
recommendation, to be placed upon probation for three years (R.
at 26, 40-46, see Addendum B ) .
A. Waiver
As a general proposition, rights granted by statute or
by the State or Federal Constitution may be waived.

See 28

Am.Jur.2d § 163 (1966)(Supp. 1988); See also Singer v. United
States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965); and Palmer v. Broadbent, 260 P.2d 581
(Utah 1953) (person for whose benefit statutory provision was
enacted may waive provision if rights of others are not
affected).
right.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known

See Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983).

Waiver

has been found to have been made either expressly or by
implication at many different stages of a criminal proceeding.
See State v. Tuttle, 399 P.2d 580 (Utah 1965) (defendant's
presentation of evidence to the jury, coupled with no prior
motion to suppress, constituted a waiver of alleged illegal

search and seizure of evidence); State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001
(Utah 1975) (waiver of right to trial by jury may be made in a
capital case); State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978) (upon plea
of guilty, defendant waived any claim of error by policeman in
application for arrest warrant that defendant had been identified
as murderer); State v. Sydall, 433 P.2d 10 (Utah 1967) (waiver of
right to preliminary examination).
There is evidence present in the record that, at the
time of defendant's sentencing, he, through his attorney,
expressly requested a three-year term of probation in lieu of a
prison sentence (R. at 26). The trial court accepted the
probationary term of three years as the combined two eighteenmonth terms for two third degree felony convictions, to be served
consecutively (T.3/17/88 at 6).

By requesting and stipulating to

the three year term, defendant either explicitly or implicitly
waived any right of probation terminating under former § 77-181(10)(a) after eighteen months of violation-free probation.
Because the waiver occurred prior to defendant's sentencing and
before the conclusion of defendant's first eighteen month
probation period, the Court of Appeals should have addressed
whether this waiver affected his statutory right to termination
of probation.

The court erred by not doing so.

It is clear on the record that defendant knew that the
trial judge was strongly leaning toward sending him to prison
(T.3/19/86 at 39). The sentencing record is replete with
instances where defendant presented arguments which were
obviously intended to persuade the court to allow him probation

rather than to incarcerate him (T.3/19/86 at 17-20, 25-34).
Granted, the recommendation found at page 26 of the Record is
entitled "Defense Counsel's Recommendations", but defendant
obviously agreed to the recommendation if it would keep him from
being sent to prison.

At the conclusion of the lengthy

sentencing hearing, the trial court, on the record, placed
defendant on probation for a period of three years under the
provision of the intensive supervision program by the Department
of Adult Probation and Parole (T.3/19/86 at 41). After
enumerating the conditions of probation, the court addressed
defendant asking if he had any questions or misunderstood any of
the provisions of the sentence.

To that, defendant answered "no"

(T.3/19/86 at 43). At no time did defendant object to the
imposition of a three year probation.

By answering the court as

defendant did, he waived his right to notice and hearing for
purposes of modifying or extending probation under former § 7718-1 (10) or (12) (1982) (Supp. 1986).3
Defendant's request to the trial court constituted an
express waiver of his right to automatic termination of probation
after eighteen months.

Defendant stated that he understood the

requirements for his probation.

Whether this waiver came

directly or through his attorney does not or should not affect
the validity of the waiver.

Defendant had the right to waive

this statutory right and it was very beneficial to do so in light
of the impending prison sentence.

Therefore, the Court of

These provisions of notice and hearing have since been
amended and can now be found under Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-1(9)
(1982) (Supp. 1989).

Appeals should have properly determined the effect of defendant's
waiver, prior to making its decision that defendant's probation
automatically terminated after eighteen months.
B. Estoppel
The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Aikers, 51 P.2d
1052 (Utah 1935), that ". . . a party cannot assign as error a
ruling which he has himself induced the court to make." I_d. at
1058.

If, in fact, the trial court was in error in sentencing

defendant to three years probation upon his conviction for two
third degree felonies, defendant should have been estopped from
assigning as error that ruling, for it was he himself who
requested and induced the court to make the ruling (R. at 26, see
Addendum B ) .
In Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978), a
plaintiff who had been convicted of drunk driving and placed on
probation filed a habeas corpus petition to restrain a city court
from revoking his probation after he was arrested for burglary.
He claimed that the original conviction was defective because the
city judge had found that he was not indigent and the judge would
not appoint counsel for him.

This Court held with regard to

estoppel:
. . . we think it should be discordant to any
one's sense of fairness and justice, as it is
our own, for a person to accept a judgment
which places him on probation during good
behavior, enjoy the benefits thereof until
his misconduct justifies revocation of the
probation, then attempt to revert back and
attack the judgment. The principle of
estoppel is not usually spoken of as applying
in the criminal law, but the principle of
fairness and good conscience pervades
throughout the law, and this plaintiff,

having enjoyed the benefit of the judgment so
long as it favored him, should not in good
conscience be allowed to turn about and
complain thereof.
Id. at 530-531.

The situation in Webster and the situation in

the present case are very much alike.

As in Webster, defendant

here received the benefit of being placed on probation, later
violated that probation, and now seeks to attack the original
term of probation after being found in violation of that
probation.

As indicated by this Court, a defendant should not be

allowed in the name of fairness and justice to accept probation
during good behavior, enjoy the benefits thereof, commit
misconduct calling for a revocation of probation, then attack the
previous ruling placing him on probation.
As this Court in Webster indicated, estoppel is not
usually spoken of as applying in the criminal law; nonetheless,
the principle has been used in the courts of this state during
criminal proceedings. See State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026 (Utah
1982) (defendant waived preliminary hearing then asked for remand
for a hearing to be held; on appeal he was estopped from
objecting to the timeliness of the hearing); State v. Danks, 418
P.2d 488 (Utah 1966) (defendant discharged retained and appointed
counsel; he was precluded on appeal from complaining about lack
of counsel); State v. Neal, 262 P.2d 756 (Utah 1953) (defendant
filed a Notice of Appeal and then a Motion for a Rehearing of
Motion for a New Trial; the motion was heard and denied.
Defendant was precluded on appeal from claiming as error that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction after the Notice of Appeal was
filed).

In the present case, defendant should be estopped from
requesting an extended probation, enjoying the benefits thereof,
then attacking that extended probation order when he violated his
probation.

The Court of Appeals erred by reversing without first

addressing the issue of estoppel.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, petitioner respectfully
requests that this Court grant the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/«*/^ day of July, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed,
postage prepaid, to James L. Shumate, attorney for defendant, 110
North Main Street, Suite H, P.O. Box 623, Cedar City, Utah,
84720, this

/ ^

day of July, 1989.

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
i

OOOOO

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Case No. 880371-CA
Leon Earl Denney,
Defendant and Appellant.

Fifth District, Iron County
The Honorable J* Philip Eves
Attorneys:

James L. Shumate, Cedar City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake City,
for Respondent

Before Judges Davidson, Garff, and Greenwood.
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Defendant appeals from the trial court's revocation of his
probation. He claims that his probation term automatically
terminated after eighteen months by operation of law pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Supp. 1986). 1 We agree
and reverse.
Defendant pleaded guilty, on September 18, 1985, to two
third degree felony charges of uttering a forged prescription
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) (1985). On March 20
1986, he was sentenced to two indeterminate sentences of sero
to five years at the Utah State Prison. The trial court
suspended the prison term and placed defendant on supervised
probation for a term of three years.
I* Utah Code Ann. § 77-18*1 was amended in 1985 and 1987. &££
1985 Utah Laws ch. 229, § 1; 1987 Utah Laws ch. 114, S 1. The
provision defendant relies upon in this appeal is currently
found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)(a) (Supp. 1988).

Defendant completed the first eighteen months of probation
without incident. However, on March 25, 1988, he was arrested
for violating the terms of his probation by allegedly
committing credit card fraud and for driving under the
influence. On April 12, 1988, the trial court ordered
defendant to appear before the court and show cause why his
probation should not be revoked. Defendant filed a motion to
terminate probation nunc pro tunc. The court denied the
motion, revoked defendantfs probation and imposed the original
two consecutive sentences of zero to five years.
Defendant argues on appeal that section 77-18-1(10)(a)
mandated that his probation be terminated after eighteen months
of incident-free probation. The state argues that it is within
the trial court's discretion to sentence defendant to two
consecutive terms of probation and that defendant waived his
right to termination of probation by expressly requesting a
three-year term of probation in lieu of a prison sentence.
Section 77-18-1(10)(a) provided that •[u]pon completion
without violation of 18 months probation in felony or class A
misdemeanor cases, . . . the offender shall be terminated from
sentence, unless the person is earlier terminated by the
court.- In State v. Green. 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court held that the term "shall* was a strong
legislative mandate that required probation to terminate after
eighteen months. "This strong mandate is not consistent with
the State's position tnat the eighteen-month term is 'tolled'
when any violation occurs within the period and that there is
no time limit for initiating a revocation action." Ifl. at
464. In response to the state's concerns regarding violation
of the public's trust, the court held that "all but technical
violations can be punished on their own merits and the
defendant's past record can be considered at that time." Id.
at 465.
Furthermore, the court held that the power to revoke
probation must be exercised within legislatively established
limits.
[w]e reaffirm that judges may exercise
sentencing discretion within those limits
established by the legislature; the power
to fix sentencing limits and the power to
suspend sentence in favor of probation ere
not inherent In the judiciary but must be
authorised by statute.

Id. at 464.
At the time this natter arose, section 77-18-1(10)(c)
provided the terms for extending probation.
At any time pijuai to the termination of
probation the court may, after a hearing
with proper notice, upon its own motion or
the motion of the prosecutor, extend
probation for good cause shown, for one
additional term of 18 months in felony or
class A misdemeanor cases or six months in
class B misdemeanor cases. The reasons
for the extension of the probation period
shall be made a part of the court record.
(Emphasis added.)2 Defendant served eighteen months of
incident-free probation. It was jifjLfiX this term of eighteen
months that the court held a hearing and determined that
defendant's probation should be revoked.
After reviewing' the record, it appears that the trial
court may have intended to sentence defendant to two
consecutive terms of probation lasting eighteen months each.
At the hearing on the motion to terminate defendant's
probation, held approximately two years after the probation
order went into effect, the court stated *[t]he eighteen months
probation was imposed on each felony to run consecutively.•
However, neither the verbal nor the written judgment made
any mention of two consecutive terms. Rather, the order
unequivocally stated: "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
Defendant, Leon Earl Denney, be placed on probation for a
period of three (3) years from and after March 20, 1986."
2.

This section now reads:
At any time prior to the termination of
probation, upon a minimum of five days'
notice and a hearing or upon a waiver of
the notice and hearing by the probationer,
the court may extend probation for an
additional term of 18 months in felony or
class A misdemeanors or six months in
class B misdemeanors if fines or
restitution or both are owing.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)(c) (Supp. 1988).

An unambiguous order made in a criminal proceeding cannot
be varied by remarks made in a later hearing to coincide with
what the judge may have intended. 'Where the language of a
judgment is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect as
it is written • • . .• State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. App. 466, 659
P.2d 918, 923 (1983). It is necessary that sentences be
rendered with clarity and accuracy in order to avoid the
possibility of confusion and injustice, phase v. State, 479
P.2d 337, 339 (Alaska 1971).
Broad and uniform recognition has been
given to the precept that a sentence
imposed by a court acting in a criminal
case should be definite, unequivocal and
unambiguous, so that both the defendant
and the officials charged with executing
the sentence will be fairly apprised of
the intentions of the court.
111. (footnote omitted). This principle was first articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Dauqherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363 (1926), where the Court held that
•[s]entences in criminal cases should reveal with fair
certainty the intent of the court and exclude any serious
misapprehensions by those who must execute them.* However,
"where the meaning is ambiguous, the pleadings and other
documents of record may be reviewed for purposes of construing
the meaning of the judgment." Garcia, 659 P.2d at 923.
The order, as written and pronounced, sentenced the
defendant to three years of probation. The judge did not state
in his order that the term of three years was actually two
consecutive terms of eighteen months each.3 Although, the
judge may have intended the terms to run consecutively, we do
not examine his intent where the written order is unequivocal.
Because the term of probation automatically terminated
after eighteen months, we do not reach the merits of the waiver
and estoppel argument.

3. We do not reach the merits of whether the judge may
sentence a defendant to two consecutive terms of probation
under Utah Code Ann. | 76-3-201(1) (Supp. 1988).

The judgment is reversed with directions to grant the
laotion nunc £X£ tunc terminating promption.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

Signal W. Garff, Judg

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

ADDENDUM B

DEPENSE COPNSEL'S RECOMMENDATION
One (1) year in the Iron County Jail;
A fine of $2,000.00 to be paid within the one year;
A work release from the Jail, from 6:00 A.M. until
8:00 P.M., to work and support himself and his family;
Payment of $50.00 per month for his housing in the jail
negating any expense to the State;
Mr. Denney to initiate Drug Abuse treatment, at his own
expense; and
Mr. Denney to be under strictly supervised probation
for a period three (3) years.

ADDENDUM C
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

vs.
CASE NO. 1027

LEON EARL DENNY
Defendant.
************

Upon reading the affidavit of J Lowe Barton, Probation Offiaer for Adult
Probation and Parole, of the State of Utah, asking that an Order to Show cause
be issued as to why the above-named Defandant should not have his probation
revoked and forthwith be corTmitted to the Utah State Prison.
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Defendant, named, be
ordered and required to appear before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge of
the Fifth District Court at his courtroom located at 68 South 100 East,
Parowan, Utah, at the hour of 9
of Ap/j

)

ce

AP)

on the )^tk

day

9 1988, then and there to show cause, if any, why the

probation of said Defendant should not be revoked by the Oourt and why the
said Defendant should not be forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison.
The Defendant is specifically informed, by this Order, that he has the right
to be represented by counsel at the time of hearing; and if said Defendant
cannot afford counsel, one shall be appointed for him by the Oourt. Moreover,
the Defendant is specifically informed that he has the right to present
evidence at the hearing.
DATED THIS

\2-V*

DAY OF cud!

. 1988.

OG2

COUtm OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT
Case No.: 1027
State of Utah
Plaintiff
vs.
Leon Denny
Defendant
**********

STATE OF UTAH

SS.

J Lowe Barton, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says: That he
is a District Agent for the Adult Probation and Parole Department; that on the
eighteenth day of September 1985 the above defendant was found guilty by jury
(or pleaded guilty) in the above court of (or to) the crime of Uttering a
forged prescription, a third degree felony and on March 20, 1986 was sentenced
to the term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison for said crime;
Stay of execution was granted and the defendant was placed on probation
for a period of three years commencing on March 20, 1986. He was further
ordered to enter into and abide by the conditions set forth in the Probation
Agreement, a copy of which is attached.
Itiat the defendant did violate the terms and conditions of his probation
as follows, to-wit:
ALLEGATION #1:

It is alleged that Mr. Denny is in violation of Condition 5 of
the Adult Probation t Parole Agreement, to-wit:

5 *I shall

obey all local, state and federal laws and municipal
ordinances at all times.

I shall report any arrests or

citations to the Department of Corrections within 72 hours of
occurrence*; in that, on February 5, 1988 Mr. Denny entered a
plea of no contest to the charge of D.U.I, in Tonopah,
Nevada. A $650 fine was imposed.

Mr. Denny was ordered to
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ALLEGATION #2:

It is alleged that Mr. Denny is in violation of Condition 5 of
the Adult Probation t Parole Agreement, to-wit:

5 "I shall

obey all state and federal laws and municipal ordinances at
all times.

I shall report any arrests or citations to the

Department of Corrections within 72 hours"; in that, on March
28, 1988 Mr. Denny was found to be in possession of two
financial transaction cards. One with the name Leon C.
Denning the other with the name L.C. Denning.

At the time the

search of the residence was conducted on March 25, 1988
receipts indicating the use of these financial transaction
cards were found in Mr. Denny's business records.

It should

be noted that the names appearing on the financial transaction
cards are aliases previously known to have been used by Mr.
Denny. Possession of these cards is in violation of Utah Code
76-6-506.1 and 76-6-506.2.

ALLEGATION #3:

It is alleged that Mr. Denny is violation Condition 5 of the
Adult Probation & Parole Agreement, to-wit: 5 "I shall obey
all state and federal laws and municipal ordinances at all
times.

I shall report any arrests or citations to the

Department of Corrections within 72 hours of occurrence." in
that, at the time Mr. Denny was cited for the D.U.I, noted
above, he did not report the arrest to the Office of Adult
Probation fc Parole within 72 hours of occurrence.
Investigating the situation it was also learned that Mr. Denny
was cited for a second D.U.I, offense in September of 1987.
However, this was later dismissed but was never reported to
the Office of Adult Probation t Parole in the 72 hour limit as
specified in the A&Jlt Probation & parole Agreement.
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WHEREFORE, your a f f i a n t prays t h a t an order of the Oourt issue d i r e c t i n g
and requiring the defendant, above named, t o be and appear before said Oourt
t o show cause, if any he has why the aforesaid period of probation should not
be revoked, and why said defendant should not be forthwith oomnitted t o the
Utah S t a t e P r i s o n .

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me
t h i s / ^ y " " ' day of

flfr'C'

, 1988.

Notary residing a t : Cedar City, UT 84720
My commission expires: Vr£
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